

ANNEX A

Revised Text of General Conclusions

1. To be fully effective, psychological planning at the strategic level should ideally be based on an agreed over-all strategic concept for our national psychological program. While efforts to date underline the difficulties of formulating such a concept, some progress has been made in achieving agreement on certain broad criteria to be utilized in establishing relative priorities within existing capabilities. Further progress toward the development and implementation of an agreed strategic concept for our psychological effort can take place only in conjunction with a corresponding development of capabilities and resources and an accompanying adjustment of basic national policy.

2. The United States is not making significant progress in the psychological field toward its objective of reduction and retraction of Soviet power as laid down in NSC 20/4. In considering the total cold war position of the U.S. as contrasted with that position a year ago, it is evident that in certain areas, such as Western Europe, our position has been strengthened by the good progress recorded under NATO. However, there has been some deterioration of strength in certain other areas, notably in the Near East. But this should not necessarily be attributed to superior effectiveness of Soviet propaganda.

3. A major handicap in psychological operations outside of the Iron Curtain derives from growing resentment in parts of Asia and throughout much of Europe to a "made in America" label on part of our psychological output. Of even graver significance is the increasing reaction against the military character of some of our political and economic activity. Programs designed to have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union are distorted and exploited by communist or anti-American propaganda and thus are occasioning resistance, neutralism, and charges of aggressiveness to the detriment of our psychological effort.